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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge
 
. 
This appeal seeks review of a denial of a petition for 
habeas corpus by Edward Sistrunk, an inmate in 
Respondents’ custody. After pursuing and exhausting his 
state court avenues for appeal, Sistrunk sought habeas relief 
from the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania on the basis of newly discovered evidence of 
his “actual innocence.” The District Court concluded that the 
Pennsylvania state courts’ disposition of Sistrunk’s appeal 
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was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, 
clearly established federal law, and denied his petition. We 
will affirm. 
 
The certificate of appealability (“COA”) limits our 
review to a single issue: whether Sistrunk’s habeas petition 
was timely filed according to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). By 
sheer counting of calendar days, it is undisputed that 
Sistrunk’s petition was filed long after his one-year timeliness 
period expired. But because the Anti-Terrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) provides several avenues for 
petitioners to satisfy timeliness, Sistrunk’s argument requires 
us to determine whether he is entitled to statutory tolling or 
different types of equitable tolling that might save his claim. 
Specifically, Sistrunk contends that he is entitled to: (1) 
statutory tolling on the basis of uncovering new, exculpatory 
evidence; (2) equitable tolling due to government witness 
tampering; or (3) equitable tolling because he is actually 
innocent.  
 
We conclude that Sistrunk does not qualify for these 
tolling exceptions. Sistrunk’s delays are inexcusable, his 
evidence is not “new,” and even if we permitted equitable 
tolling for actual innocence, Sistrunk’s proofs of “actual 
innocence” fall short. We will, therefore, affirm the District 
Court’s judgment.  
 
I. 
A. 
In the early morning hours of July 23, 1993, Edward 
Sistrunk used his automobile horn and headlamps to harass a 
car driven by Julmaine Moody on a residential road in 
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Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.1
 
 Both cars pulled over. An 
altercation between the cars’ occupants broke out, but ceased 
abruptly when a passenger in Moody’s car recognized a 
passenger in Sistrunk’s car as an acquaintance. All reentered 
their respective vehicles, and the cars returned to the 
roadway. Sistrunk then positioned his moving car alongside 
Moody’s, drew a revolver, aimed at a passenger in Moody’s 
car with whom he had had a heated exchange, and fired. 
Missing its intended mark, the bullet struck the unarmed and 
pregnant Moody in the head, killing her. 
Sistrunk evaded capture for three months until his 
arrest in North Carolina. Multiple witnesses identified 
Sistrunk as the shooter, including Sistrunk’s intended victim, 
David Snyder. Out of the many people who implicated 
Sistrunk in the murder, one witness of particular significance 
here, Gregory Anderson, gave a statement to police and 
testified at a preliminary hearing on January 6, 1994, that he 
was in Sistrunk’s car at the time of the murder and that 
Sistrunk was the murderer. Anderson disappeared before trial 
and therefore did not testify, but Sistrunk’s defense counsel 
successfully argued to admit Anderson’s hearing testimony at 
trial. The trial court found as a fact that all witnesses agreed 
Sistrunk was the shooter.  
 
On May 18, 1995, the court sentenced Sistrunk to life 
imprisonment for murdering Moody. In addition, the court 
                                              
1 AEDPA requires us to presume that the state courts’ factual 
findings are valid and binding, absent clear and convincing 
evidence to the contrary. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). We thus 
relate the relevant facts as found by the Pennsylvania state 
courts. 
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sentenced Sistrunk to concurrent imprisonment terms for 
possession of an instrument of crime, reckless endangerment, 
and simple assault. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed 
Sistrunk’s sentence on July 19, 1996. The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court then denied Sistrunk’s petition for allowance 
of appeal on December 11, 1996. His conviction became final 
on March 11, 1997, when Sistrunk’s deadline for filing a 
petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court 
passed. See 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c); Kapral v. United States
 
, 166 
F.3d 565, 575 (3d Cir. 1999). 
B. 
Sistrunk filed a petition for relief under the 
Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 9541-9546, on December 11, 1997, 
contending that his appellate counsel was ineffective for 
failing to challenge the effectiveness of his trial counsel. The 
PCRA court dismissed Sistrunk’s petition because Sistrunk 
had already litigated the issues on direct appeal. The 
Pennsylvania Superior Court then affirmed this dismissal on 
June 19, 2000.  
 
Sistrunk filed a second PCRA petition on June 26, 
2002, contending that newly discovered evidence entitled him 
to a new trial or evidentiary hearing. Sistrunk alleged that he 
had uncovered evidence proving that another person had 
confessed to shooting Moody. Sistrunk claimed to have first 
heard on April 29, 2002, that Damon Rodriguez—now 
deceased—had told Manuel Rodriguez in 1993 that Damon 
had driven the car on the night of the murder and had shot 
Moody. The PCRA court dismissed this petition as untimely 
on July 9, 2003. The Superior Court affirmed this dismissal 
on January 26, 2005. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court then 
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denied Sistrunk’s petition for allowance of appeal on October 
4, 2005.  
 
On August 18, 2006, Sistrunk filed a third PCRA 
petition, asking the PCRA court to vacate his conviction 
based on more newly discovered evidence of his actual 
innocence. In this petition, Sistrunk alleged that his attorney 
received a letter from Gregory Anderson—Sistrunk’s 
cousin—on June 22, 2006, admitting to perjuring himself at 
Sistrunk’s preliminary hearing by testifying that Sistrunk was 
the shooter. Anderson further claimed that police 
investigators coerced him into giving false testimony, 
specifically against Sistrunk, by threatening to charge 
Anderson with conspiracy. After testifying to Sistrunk’s 
detriment at the preliminary hearing and then failing to appear 
at trial, Sistrunk claimed that Anderson felt the need to finally 
clear his conscience.  
 
C. 
This third PCRA petition pended in Pennsylvania state 
court when Sistrunk filed his federal petition, on December 
22, 2006. In it, Sistrunk raised two claims for relief based on 
newly discovered evidence of innocence: (1) the Damon 
Rodriguez confession, which Sistrunk learned about on April 
29, 2002; and (2) the Gregory Anderson letter, which Sistrunk 
received on June 22, 2006. On July 5, 2007, Magistrate Judge 
Hey issued a Report and Recommendation, advising 
dismissal of both claims. In an Order-Memorandum filed on 
October 31, 2007, the District Court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania adopted the Recommendation to dismiss 
Sistrunk’s Rodriguez claim, but, because Sistrunk’s third 
PCRA petition still pended, the District Court stayed the 
Anderson claim. On October 30, 2008, the District Court 
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recommitted the claim to Magistrate Judge Hey for a 
Supplemental Report and Recommendation.  
 
On February 24, 2009, Magistrate Judge Hey 
recommended that Sistrunk’s Anderson claim be dismissed as 
time-barred. The magistrate judge concluded that: Sistrunk’s 
conviction became final on March 11, 1997; Sistrunk’s 
federal petition was filed on December 22, 2006, seven years 
past AEDPA’s time limit, see
 
 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); the 
Anderson letter was not “newly discovered evidence” under 
§ 2244(d)(1)(D), and thus did not create a new one-year 
limitations period; Sistrunk’s third PCRA petition did not toll 
the AEDPA limitations period; Sistrunk was not entitled to 
equitable tolling; and no COA should issue.  
Sistrunk filed his objections with the District Court on 
March 5, 2009. The District Court concluded that none of 
Sistrunk’s objections had merit, affirmed the magistrate 
judge’s denial of a COA, and dismissed Sistrunk’s habeas 
petition with prejudice on April 21, 2009. Sistrunk then filed 
an application for a COA with this Court under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2253(c)(1), which we granted on March 7, 2011.  
 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(a). As discussed below in Part III, we have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(c).  
We apply a mixed standard of review. We scrutinize 
jurisdictional questions and legal conclusions under a plenary 
standard of review. See Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 
231 (3d Cir. 2004). On the merits, however, “a federal court 
is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the 
Constitution, law, or treaties of the United States.” Estelle v. 
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McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). “[A] state court’s 
interpretation of state law . . . binds a federal court sitting in 
habeas corpus.” Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005). 
Under AEDPA, moreover, we must deny the writ unless the 
petitioner shows that the state court conviction unreasonably 
applied clearly established federal law, was contrary to 
clearly established federal law, or was based on an 
“objectively unreasonable” determination of the facts in light 
of the evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor
 
, 
529 U.S. 362, 409-410 (2000). 
III. 
 Before turning to Sistrunk’s substantive arguments, we 
address briefly—and ultimately dismiss—the government’s 
contention that we lack jurisdiction because Sistrunk’s habeas 
petition does not state a constitutional claim. This argument 
attacks our jurisdiction on two levels. First, the government 
contends that the absence of a constitutional claim renders the 
COA defective, barring us from considering Sistrunk’s 
claims. Second, the government argues that Sistrunk’s 
petition points only to his imprisonment-while-actually-
innocent as a constitutional harm. Because, in the 
government’s view, a freestanding claim of innocence is not a 
proper “basis for federal habeas relief absent an independent 
constitutional violation occurring in the state trial,” Albrecht 
v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103, 121 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Herrera v. 
Collins
 
, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993)), Sistrunk’s petition—even 
if it were timely—would lack the requisite underlying 
“independent constitutional violation” needed for our 
jurisdiction. 
 We conclude that our exercise of jurisdiction is proper. 
First, the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Gonzalez 
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v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641 (2012), destroys the government’s 
attack on the COA. Even a defective COA does not thwart 
our jurisdiction. Rather, “[o]nce a judge has made the 
determination that a COA is warranted”—which has 
happened here—“the COA has fulfilled [its] gatekeeping 
function.” Id. at 650. No further scrutiny of the COA is 
necessary. See id.
 
 at 652 (“[Section] 2253(c)(3) is a 
nonjurisdictional rule . . . .”).  
Second, we need not address whether a freestanding 
claim of actual innocence would be cognizable on federal 
habeas review because that is not all that Sistrunk’s petition 
offers.2
                                              
2 Neither this Court nor the Supreme Court has ever held that 
a freestanding claim of innocence merits habeas relief. See, 
e.g., Han Tak Lee v. Glunt, 667 F.3d 397, 403 n.5 (3d Cir. 
2012) (reserving the issue expressly while permitting the 
petitioner’s claim to proceed on due process grounds); United 
States v. Davies, 394 F.3d 182, 191 n.8 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(highlighting without ruling on the petitioner’s actual 
innocence claim). Other courts have discussed the issue and 
reached divergent conclusions. See, e.g., Souter v. Jones, 395 
F.3d 577, 599 (6th Cir. 2005) (permitting equitable tolling for 
a “credible showing of actual innocence”); Cousin v. Lensing, 
310 F.3d 843, 849 (5th Cir. 2002) (rejecting an actual 
innocence equitable tolling claim). Indeed, the Supreme Court 
noted in discussing whether actual innocence implicates the 
Constitution that “[w]hether such a federal right exists is an 
open question. [Courts] have struggled with it over the years, 
in some cases assuming, arguendo, that it exists while also 
noting the difficult questions such a right would pose and the 
high standard any claimant would have to meet.” Dist. Att’ys 
 Sistrunk’s claims of innocence, rather, expressly 
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incorporate separate constitutional violations. Sistrunk states 
in his petition that he “was denied his Fourteenth and Sixth 
Amendment rights,” not only because he is allegedly 
innocent, but also because newly discovered evidence shows 
that witnesses colluded to keep the identity of the real 
murderer a secret and one witness—Gregory Anderson—
perjured himself due to government coercion. These claims 
are probative of innocence, to be sure, but they also implicate 
sufficiently Sistrunk’s right to due process. Indeed, “a 
conviction obtained through use of false evidence, known to 
be such by representatives of the State, must fall under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.” Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 
269 (1959); see Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 242 (3d 
Cir. 2004) (stating that the government may not knowingly 
use perjured testimony at trial). “The same result obtains 
when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows 
it to go uncorrected when it appears.” Napue, 360 U.S. at 269; 
see United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (“[T]he 
Court has consistently held that a conviction obtained by the 
knowing use of perjured testimony is fundamentally unfair.”); 
Maxwell v. Roe, 628 F.3d 486, 506 (9th Cir. 2010) (granting 
habeas relief based on an actual innocence claim for a 
conviction stemming in part from perjured testimony). 
Moreover, the teachings of Brady v. Maryland
                                                                                                     
Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 
2308, 2321 (2009) (citations omitted). 
, 373 U.S. 83, 
87 (1963), require prosecutors to disclose any benefits that 
are given to a witness, including any possible lenient 
treatment in a given case. Although the veracity of Sistrunk’s 
allegations may be in question, the constitutional violations 
they encompass comprise an integral and unavoidable part of 
Sistrunk’s new-evidence-of-innocence claims: on the way to 
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demonstrating his innocence, Sistrunk’s new evidence would 
show also that the government violated Sistrunk’s due 
process rights. Such a showing would unquestionably 
establish one or more “independent constitutional violations” 
and therefore would grant us jurisdiction to review the merits 
of Sistrunk’s petition if—and only if—it is timely.3
 
 We turn 
now to address that question. 
IV. 
There can be no dispute that Sistrunk’s petition would 
be time-barred without AEDPA’s tolling exceptions. 
Sistrunk’s conviction became final on March 11, 1997. See 
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). He had until one year from that date 
to file a habeas petition. Id.
 
 § 2244(d)(1)(A). Sistrunk did not 
file his federal petition, however, until December 22, 2006, 
many years too tardy. Sistrunk then rushed to raise three 
tolling arguments, any one of which would salvage his 
otherwise-barred petition. He contends that he is entitled to: 
(1) statutory tolling of his entire petition under § 2244(d)(2) 
for the time during which his state postconviction review 
pended; (2) equitable tolling because of the discovery of new 
evidence; or (3) equitable tolling because he is actually 
innocent. We ultimately reject each, and will affirm the 
District Court’s judgment. 
A. 
Sistrunk contends first that his petition is subject to 
AEDPA’s express statutory tolling provision, which permits 
tolling for the time during which a properly filed application 
                                              
3 As discussed infra, because we conclude that Sistrunk’s 
petition is not timely, we do not reach the merits of his claims 
to determine whether such a violation actually occurred. 
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for state postconviction review is pending in state courts. See 
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Swartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 417, 420 
(3d Cir. 2000). Sistrunk’s application was indeed 
“pending”—he filed a new petition for review in the state 
PCRA court within 60 days of receiving the letter. The issue 
here is whether the application was “properly filed.” 
Although AEDPA permits a tardy state court filing upon the 
discovery of new evidence, see
 
 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D), 
Sistrunk’s contention depends on whether the Anderson letter 
fits within AEDPA’s definition of “new” evidence: the date 
on which the “factual predicate” of the evidence was known. 
We hold that it does not. 
The District Court concluded that Sistrunk’s petition 
for state review was not properly filed because the Anderson 
letter did not constitute newly discovered evidence under 
§ 2244(d)(1)(D). Rather, the District Court held, Sistrunk 
knew of Anderson’s perjury no later than January 1994, over 
a decade before he supposedly uncovered this evidence.  
 
Sistrunk contends that this holding was in error, 
because he did not learn of the factual predicate underlying 
Anderson’s letter until June 22, 2006, when his attorney 
received it. His knowledge of his own innocence 
notwithstanding, Sistrunk insists that he could not have 
introduced evidence about Anderson’s initial reticence to 
come forward, the perjury of a key witness, police 
misconduct, or witness tampering until his receipt of 
Anderson’s revelations.4
                                              
4 Assuming Anderson’s letter succeeds in tolling Sistrunk’s 
time to file, Sistrunk also contends that this letter permits him 
to bootstrap the Rodriguez claim into his petition. See Sweger 
 The government responds that the 
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“facts” of Sistrunk’s innocence and Anderson’s perjury were 
long ago determined, and the appearance of a new witness to 
testify to that fact does not restart the limitations period.  
 
Because the Anderson letter does not fit within 
AEDPA’s definition of “new” evidence, we agree with the 
District Court that Sistrunk’s petition was improperly filed, 
and thus, cannot toll AEDPA’s limitations period. Evidence 
becomes “known” on “the date on which the factual predicate 
of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered 
through the exercise of reasonable diligence.” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(d)(1)(D). Here, the PCRA court found that Sistrunk 
not only could have known, but actually did know of the vital 
facts underlying both the Anderson letter and Rodriguez 
affidavit—i.e., Damon Rodriguez was the real shooter and 
Gregory Anderson perjured himself—long before the filing of 
his habeas petition. See App. 00092. This finding by the state 
court binds us. See Warren v. Kyler, 422 F.3d 132, 136 (3d 
Cir. 2005) (“‘[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court 
to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law 
questions.’” (quoting Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68)). Because 
evidence that is “previously known, but only newly available” 
does not constitute “newly discovered evidence,” United 
States v. Jasin
                                                                                                     
v. Chesney, 294 F.3d 506, 520 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that 
tolling applies to the entire petition so long as the state 
proceeding attacks the same judgment as the habeas petition 
does). Because we deny Sistrunk’s tolling claim related to the 
Anderson letter, his attempt to revive his barred contentions 
concerning the Rodriguez affidavit also fails. 
, 280 F.3d 355, 362 (3d Cir. 2002), we will not 
construe the evidence of innocence Sistrunk offers as “new.” 
Similarly, to the extent that the Anderson letter introduced 
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new evidence of the reasons behind Anderson’s perjury, 
“evidence known but unavailable at trial does not constitute 
‘newly discovered evidence’ within the meaning of Rule 33.” 
Id.
 
  
B. 
Sistrunk next contends that the government’s attempt 
to actively mislead him with respect to his Rodriguez 
affidavit claim entitles him to equitable tolling. Because 
Sistrunk cannot show both (1) extraordinarily burdensome 
circumstances as well as (2) reasonable diligence in 
investigating the claim, see Schlueter v. Varner
 
, 384 F.3d 69, 
78 (3d Cir. 2004), we hold that he cannot avail himself of 
equitable tolling.  
The District Court rejected this contention because 
Sistrunk knew of Rodriguez’s guilt and Anderson’s perjury 
and yet did nothing about these facts for twelve years, placing 
his case far outside the bounds of “reasonable diligence.” 
 
Sistrunk, seeking to construct an unstated declaration 
of what the court meant but did not say, contends that he was 
“actively misled” by the PCRA court. According to Sistrunk, 
although the PCRA court dismissed his entire petition as 
untimely, it did not mean to affix the label “untimely” to all 
of the claims within the petition, but meant instead to dismiss 
his affidavit claim on the merits. Because the court’s alleged 
misstating led Sistrunk to believe his claim was dismissed as 
untimely, he had thought that a federal habeas petition would 
be futile. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo
 
, 544 U.S. 408, 417 (2005). 
After discovering the “error” in 2006, Sistrunk then 
“diligently” filed his federal petition.  
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The government responds that reinventing language in 
a judicial opinion—assuming arguendo that the opinion was 
mistaken—provides no grounds for equitable tolling.5 The 
government contends, moreover, that reasonable diligence 
cannot mean that a habeas petitioner may “sit quietly by, 
knowing there are multiple witnesses to his version of events, 
and do nothing to present this evidence to any court for years 
on end.” Gov’t Br. at 39; cf. Schlup v. Delo
 
, 513 U.S. 298, 
332 (1995) (holding that courts “may consider how the timing 
of the submission and the likely credibility of the affiants bear 
on the probable reliability of that evidence” when considering 
claims of innocence).  
Both the Supreme Court and this Court agree with the 
District Court that Sistrunk’s claims do not qualify for 
equitable tolling. AEDPA does not provide additional 
justifications for tolling its one-year time limit beyond the 
specific instances listed in § 2244(d). Although we have 
recognized rare situations in which equity permits tolling, see 
Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010) (holding that 
AEDPA’s time limitations are “subject to equitable tolling in 
appropriate cases”); Miller v. N.J. State Dep’t of Corr.
 
, 145 
F.3d 616, 617 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that equitable tolling 
may only occur when a petitioner has been extraordinarily 
prevented from asserting his rights), this is not one of those 
situations. 
As we have explained, “[t]here are no bright lines in 
determining whether equitable tolling is warranted in a given 
                                              
5 The government is correct that the PCRA court indeed 
rejected Sistrunk’s Rodriguez claim as untimely. See App. 
00026.   
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case.” Pabon v. Mahanoy, 654 F.3d 385, 399 (3d Cir. 2011). 
Nevertheless, “courts must be sparing in their use of equitable 
tolling,” Seitzinger v. Reading Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 165 
F.3d 236, 239 (3d Cir. 1999), and should do so “only when 
the principles of equity would make the rigid application of a 
limitation period unfair.” Miller, 145 F.3d at 618 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). The Supreme Court 
has provided guidance as to when the “principles of equity” 
permit equitable tolling: “[A] petitioner is entitled to 
equitable tolling only if he shows (1) that he has been 
pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary 
circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” 
Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2562-2563 (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted). This conjunctive standard requires 
showing both elements before we will permit tolling. See 
Schlueter
 
, 384 F.3d at 78.  
Here, it is readily apparent that Sistrunk cannot meet 
the Holland standard, as he has shown neither diligence nor 
extraordinarily burdensome circumstances. As for diligence, 
Sistrunk was in the car on the night of the shooting with three 
other people, one of whom—Damon Rodriguez—was the 
supposed killer. One passenger, Gregory Anderson, testified 
against Sistrunk. In the intervening years, Sistrunk made no 
effort to get Anderson to recant his testimony or to get the 
other passengers to testify. As the PCRA court concluded, 
Sistrunk (a) knew of both Rodriguez’s guilt and Anderson’s 
perjury and (b) did nothing about either for 12 years. When a 
petitioner has knowledge of his innocence and of witnesses 
who might testify to it, “[m]ere excusable neglect is not 
sufficient” to show diligence. Miller, 145 F.3d at 619. 
Sistrunk waited far too long to possibly claim that he has 
diligently pursued this claim. See Pace, 544 U.S. at 418-419 
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(holding that a five-month delay demonstrated a lack of 
diligence). 
 
Moreover, even if we held that Sistrunk were diligent, 
he has not been extraordinarily burdened or prevented from 
pressing his claim. We have a high standard for 
“extraordinary circumstances.” See, e.g., Pabon, 654 F.3d at 
400 (holding that a defendant’s inability to speak English and 
the lack of Spanish language legal materials or interpreters 
constituted extraordinary circumstances). Even assuming that 
the PCRA court dismissed Sistrunk’s claim on the merits, and 
not for timeliness reasons, misreading a court opinion is not 
an “extraordinary circumstance [that] stood in his way and 
prevented timely filing.” Holland
 
, 130 S. Ct. at 2562-2563 
(citations omitted).  
Sistrunk needed to show both diligence and 
extraordinary circumstances to succeed on his equitable 
tolling argument. He can show neither. As a result, we 
conclude that the District Court correctly dismissed Sistrunk’s 
first equitable tolling claim. 
 
III. 
Finally, Sistrunk contends that he is entitled to 
equitable tolling on the separate ground that he is introducing 
evidence of “actual innocence,” a claim that should permit 
him to clear any procedural hurdles to obtaining a new 
evidentiary hearing on his innocence. We disagree. 
Regardless of whether we adopt the contention that Sistrunk’s 
actual innocence might permit equitable tolling, we hold that 
Sistrunk has not shown that the evidence he seeks to submit 
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demonstrates that he is actually innocent. We therefore will 
affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Sistrunk’s petition.6
 
  
Sistrunk contends that the evidence he now offers—the 
Anderson letter and the Rodriguez affidavit—satisfies the 
Supreme Court’s standard for actual innocence: that no 
reasonable juror would have voted to find Sistrunk guilty had 
these pieces of evidence been available at trial. See Bousley 
v. United States
 
, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998) (“‘Actual 
innocence’ means factual innocence, not mere legal 
insufficiency.” (citation omitted)). Sistrunk then argues that 
this evidence of innocence entitles him to equitable tolling. 
The government responds that, even if we were to hold that a 
legitimate actual innocence claim could permit equitable 
tolling, Sistrunk’s case falls far short of “actual innocence.”  
We conclude that Sistrunk is not entitled to equitable 
tolling for actual innocence because he cannot show that he 
is, in fact, innocent.7 Proving actual innocence based on new 
evidence requires the petitioner to demonstrate (1) new 
evidence (2) that is reliable and (3) so probative of innocence 
that no reasonable juror would have convicted the petitioner. 
Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324, 327; see also House v. Bell, 547 
U.S. 518, 536-537 (2006). All three Schlup
                                              
6 The District Court dismissed this claim entirely on the 
ground that Sistrunk has not been diligent. Because Sistrunk’s 
claim, as he crafts it, would trump the diligence requirement 
from above, we proceed to discuss it in greater detail. 
 factors are 
 
7 We do not decide whether a petitioner’s actual innocence 
might permit equitable tolling because, even if it could, 
Sistrunk does not meet the preliminary requirement of 
demonstrating his innocence.  
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necessary for Sistrunk to prevail. See House
 
, 547 U.S. at 536-
537. He fails each.  
First, as discussed, Sistrunk’s evidence is not “new.” 
Second, even if it were, it is not reliable. The Pennsylvania 
PCRA court’s factual finding that Rodriguez’s affidavit is 
unreliable binds us, and Sistrunk has not shown clear and 
convincing evidence to the contrary. See Werts v. Vaughn, 
228 F.3d 178, 196 (3d Cir. 2000). The Anderson letter, too, is 
not reliable—it comes nearly a decade too tardy from another 
prisoner, who is related to Sistrunk and admits to having lied 
once before. Cf. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 414 (1988) 
(“It is . . . reasonable to presume that there is something 
suspect about a defense witness who is not identified until 
after the 11th hour has passed.”); Dobbert v. Wainwright, 468 
U.S. 1231, 1233-1234 (1984) (“Recantation testimony is 
properly viewed with great suspicion. It . . . is very often 
unreliable . . . , and most often serves merely to impeach 
cumulative evidence rather than to undermine confidence in 
the accuracy of the conviction.”); Landano v. Rafferty, 856 
F.2d 569, 572 (3d Cir. 1988) (“Courts have historically 
viewed recantation testimony with great suspicion.”). Third, 
Sistrunk’s new evidence simply cannot be evaluated as so 
probative of his innocence that no reasonable juror could have 
convicted him. Schlup sets a supremely high bar. Neither the 
recantation of a witness who did not even testify at trial nor 
the second-hand retelling of a jailhouse confession can clear 
it. There were several eyewitnesses to the crime, all of whom 
implicated Sistrunk at trial. Adding Sistrunk’s offered 
evidence into the mix would still permit a reasonable juror to 
vote to convict. Sistrunk thus cannot meet Schlup’s standard 
for actual innocence and cannot avail himself of equitable 
tolling on that basis.  
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V. 
We hold that Sistrunk’s petition is time-barred, and is 
subject to neither statutory nor equitable tolling. We will 
therefore AFFIRM the District Court’s judgment. 
 
